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The present research aims at showing that ambivalence may serve an adaptive function: to preserve
attitudes and to resist persuasion. In two experiments, participants were exposed to a counter-
attitudinal message attributed to an ingroup majority. Results of both experiments showed that
individuals high in ambivalence changed toward the source more than individuals low in ambivalence
at the direct level, while at the indirect level––where the link between attitudes and the source’s
message is less apparent––individuals low in ambivalence changed toward the source more than
individuals high in ambivalence. Experiment 2 also showed that this effect is particularly true for
high self-monitoring participants, thereby supporting a motivational interpretation of the effect.
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The aim of the present research is to propose that attitudinal ambivalence may serve an adaptive
function: to preserve attitudes and to resist persuasion. Ambivalence has been described as a
detrimental structural aspect of attitudes, in that it contributes to weakening attitudes (Petty &
Krosnick, 1995); indeed, high levels of ambivalence have been generally associated with low
accessibility of attitudes, attitudinal moderation, low confidence, and low attitude-behavior coherence
(Conner et al., 2002; Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000). Attitudinal weakness is considered as a
detrimental factor in the literature because it has been observed that the stronger the attitudes, the better
they serve their fundamental function of object appraisal (Fazio, 2000). Indeed, several results have
converged to show that attitudinal ambivalence forces individuals to start information processing
all over again every time they face an attitude object (Broemer, 1988; Hanze, 2001; Van der Pligt,
De Vries, Manstead, & Van Harreveld, 2000). In particular, Maio, Bell, and Esses (1996) have showniversita` di Modena-Reggio Emilia, via Allegri 9, 42100 Reggio Emilia, Italy.
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2 Nicoletta Cavazza and Fabrizio Buterathat participants high in ambivalence are more involved in systematic processing and are more
persuaded by strong than by weak arguments. With respect to these findings, Maio and Olson (2000)
consider that the exact function of ambivalent attitudes is still an unsolved question: ‘The functions
fulfilled by ambivalent attitudes are particularly interesting because ambivalence should be aversive
[. . .]. A challenge for future research is to further explore the functions fulfilled by ambivalent
attitudes’. (p. 430). The present work aims at contributing to this exploration.
In fact, some studies have shown positive consequences of attitudinal ambivalence. Hanze (2001)
showed that, in case of conflict, ambivalence reduces action readiness and promotes careful thinking
about the attitude object in search of a suitable solution. Mucchi Faina, Costarelli, and Romoli (2002)
pointed out that ambivalence toward the ingroup and the outgroup allows people to hide ingroup
favoritism and to comply with the fairness norm. Furthermore, emotional ambivalence can enhance
creativity (Fong, 2003) and functions as a motivational mechanism to affect smoking cessation
(Lipkus, Green, Feaganes, & Sedikides, 2001). These articles, however, did not claim that attitudinal
ambivalence could be functional.
The present research aims at contributing to the debate on the function of ambivalent attitudes with
the following proposition: Ambivalent attitudes could be in fact highly adaptive because the
coexistence of positive and negative components allows people to express their position by putting
forward the component that best fit the specific normative context (i.e., the norm shared by the
immediately relevant majority), with no need to change or to feel inappropriate. For example,
Monica––who holds ambivalent attitudes toward traffic restrictions––is perfectly able to contend that
the level of pollution is now too high and traffic restrictions should be implemented, when talking about
the children’s health at kindergarten, but also to contend that living in cities is absolutely impossible
without a car when discussing with a group of commuters. Ambivalence allows her to participate in
both discussions without changing her general attitude. In other words, the structural flexibility of
ambivalent attitudes would be a strength rather than a weakness.
In the perspective of attitudes-as-construction models (Schwartz, 2000; Wilson & Hodges, 1992),
there may be other cases in which attitudes are flexible and context-sensitive. These authors conceive
attitudes as temporary evaluative judgments that individuals construct on the spot from accessible
information. In particular, people may have more than one appraisal of the same attitude object––an
implicit attitude and an explicit one––and they express the most accessible one (i.e., dual attitudes,
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Indeed, people are often unaware of the existence of the implicit
attitude associated to the explicit one; according to the dual-attitude model (Wilson et al., 2000), when
they are aware, they may view it as illegitimate or unwanted and may be motivated to override it with
the explicit attitude (the authors call this case ‘motivated overriding’). Thus, Wilson et al. explicitly
differentiate dual attitudes from ambivalent attitudes, pointing out that when people are ambivalent
they are aware of having different evaluations of the same attitude object but they view both as
legitimate and compelling.ATTITUDINAL AMBIVALENCE AND ATTITUDE CHANGEPetty and Krosnick (1995) have proposed that attitudes can be considered as strong attitudes when they
are persistent over time, resistant to persuasion, and they have an impact on thoughts and behavior. In
the present research we will focus on the second characteristic, the resistance to persuasion attempts,
since it is particularly relevant to study our general hypothesis that ambivalent attitudes can serve as a
protection against pressure to change. The relevant literature is not unanimous in describing whetherCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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Attitudinal ambivalence and persuasion 3ambivalent attitudes are more or less permeable to persuasive communication than less ambivalent
attitudes. In their review, Jonas et al. (2000) have formulated the hypothesis that ambivalent attitudes
would be more resistant to persuasion, since they already contain in their structure elements consistent
with the position maintained by the persuasive message. This is consistent with Eagly, Chen, Chaiken,
and Shaw-Barnes’ (1999) position. On the contrary, work by Armitage and Conner (2002) and by
Bassili (1996) has argued that ambivalent (vs. nonambivalent) participants are more influenced by a
persuasive message. However, Maio et al.’s results (1996) revealed that ambivalent participants were
indeed more influenced by a persuasive message than nonambivalent participants, but only with strong
arguments. Additionally, Broemer’s work (2002) also showed this difference, but only when persuasive
communication was constructed with a negatively framed message.
The above contradiction might be due to a differential ‘normativity’ of the persuasive messages.
For instance, Hodson, Maio, and Esses (2001), who gave their participants consensus information
(the majority’s norm), showed that participants with high ambivalence scores shifted their
position toward the majority’s position (be it pro or con), whereas participants with low ambivalence
scores shifted away from the majority. Furthermore, Bell and Esses (2002) found that ambivalent
participants polarized their attitudes toward Native people in Canada as a consequence of message
exposure only when they were led to believe that ambivalence is something bad, but not when
ambivalence was framed as something good. It therefore appears difficult, on the basis of the above
evidence, to contend that ambivalent attitudes are easier to influence and thereby weaker. It is possible,
indeed, that the change sometimes observed in ambivalent individuals is in fact an opportunity they
take to adapt to the normative context, without a real change in the overall attitudinal structure. In other
words, it is possible that ambivalent individuals use a sort of compliance in order to manifest their
agreement and at the same time to avoid a more structural change. This is not to say that resistance to
change is adaptive per se: For example, a heavy smoker resisting a public health advertisement urging
that smoker to quit might seem to be engaging in the opposite of an adaptive behavior. However, we
hypothesize here that ambivalence might be used to adapt to the social environment, in a way that allow
respecting the normative context while avoiding a deep change, one that involves both direct and
indirect attitudes.DIRECT AND INDIRECT ATTITUDE CHANGEIn order to address the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of change in highly ambivalent individuals,
it was necessary to measure attitude change both at the direct and at the indirect level. Indeed, it is quite
easy for individuals to comply (because they want to follow the norm) or to resist (because they want to
show independence) to a source of influence at the direct level, that is, directly on the topic contained in
the influence message. When people are asked to express their attitude toward the message topic, most
of the time they can control their answer as a function of the normative context (Moscovici, 1980).
However, it is more difficult for individuals to control their answer at the indirect level, that is, on a
topic related to the influence message, underlain by the same general attitude, but not recognizable as a
part of the influence message. This distinction has been successfully applied in several lines of research
in the area of social influence and persuasion, as for instance in Alvaro and Crano (1997: Gays in the
military and gun control), Mackie (1987: public disclosure of the names of juvenile convicts and
protection of the rights of victims), and Pe´rez and Mugny (1987: abortion and contraception). See also
Crano and Prislin (2006) for a recent discussion. Common features of these studies are that (a) the twoCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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(between .30 and .60), and (c) one is contained in the influence message and the other is not.
We adopted this distinction to study direct and indirect attitude change in individuals high and low in
ambivalence. It is important to note that the direct versus indirect distinction does not imply the same
stakes as the explicit versus implicit distinction (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), although they
both address the problem of unobtrusively assessing attitudes. While the latter aims at comparing
conscious versus unconscious attitudes, the direct–indirect distinction allows comparing attitudes
toward themes directly mentioned by the influence source with attitudes toward themes not mentioned
by the influence source, but underlain by the same general attitude (i.e., Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette,
Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994).DIFFERENTIAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT CHANGE OF INDIVIDUALS
HIGH AND LOW IN AMBIVALENCEIf it is true that ambivalence can be adaptive, we should show that highly ambivalent individuals may be
strong in situations where individuals low in ambivalence are vulnerable. An interesting situation to
study this idea is what scholars of conflict elaboration theory have termed normative conflict (e.g.,
Pe´rez & Mugny, 1996). Normative conflict refers to situations where individuals find themselves in
disagreement with the position of the majority of their ingroup, that is, situations where their attitude
conflicts the norm. The prediction of the conflict elaboration theory is that when an individual cannot
comply with the ingroup majority––say, because one has already revealed one’s attitude or because one
is committed to one’s position––direct change would not be observed (for consistency reasons), but
instead indirect change would take place, in order to restore similarity with the ingroup majority. This
prediction has been successfully tested both with natural groups (e.g., Sanchez-Mazas, Mugny, &
Jovanovic, 1996; see Pe´rez & Mugny, 1996, for an account in English) and with minimal groups (e.g.,
Mun˜oz, Falomir, Invernizzi, & Leuenberger, 2000). These results are consistent with work
documenting that the discrepancy between own attitude and the ingroup norm can lead to latent (e.g.,
Devine, Monteith, Zuwernik, & Elliot, 1991; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986) and persistent change (e.g.,
Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001).
The normative conflict situation is particularly relevant for individuals low in ambivalence. Indeed,
when confronted with a counter-attitudinal message formulated by the ingroup majority, their clear,
uniform, attitude should lead these individuals to resist change at the direct level and to be consistent
with their own position, more so than highly ambivalent individuals who should have no problem in
complying with the ingroup majority at this level; however, disagreement with the ingroup majority is a
difficult position to hold and should result in more indirect change for individuals low in ambivalence
than for highly ambivalent individuals, who do not need to resist at the direct level and thereby have a
lower need to change at the indirect level. This idea relies on the principle that resistance at one level
will displace influence at another level, as argued by several lines of research on social influence
(Moscovici, 1980), conflict elaboration (Pe´rez & Mugny, 1996), social cognition (Wegner, Schneider,
Carter, & White, 1987), and intergroup relations (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). In sum, we
hypothesize that, confronted to a counter-attitudinal message formulated by the ingroup majority,
individuals high in ambivalence should change toward the source more than individuals low in
ambivalence at the direct level, while at the indirect level individuals low in ambivalence should change
toward the source more than individuals high in ambivalence. In other words we predict an interaction
effect between levels of ambivalence and levels of attitude change.Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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Participants
One-hundred and fifty-five 2nd-year communication sciences students at Bologna University and
Modena-Reggio Emilia University volunteered for this experiment. Forty-seven were men and 108
women with a mean age of 21.82 (SD¼ 2.36). The effect of sex and that of university have been tested
in all analyses; they did not yield any significant main or interaction effects and therefore will not be
presented.Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to fill in two separate questionnaires at the beginning of a regular course. Two
experimenters stressed the fact that the two booklets corresponded to two different studies (and in fact
they appeared very different in aspect), carried out by the two different researchers. The first, pretest,
questionnaire was presented as a survey on different topics debated in social life; it contained 20 items
on various topics such as ‘pollution is mainly caused by industries’ and ‘euthanasia is an immoral
practice’. Participants responded on seven-point scales ranging from ‘completely disagree’ to
‘completely agree’. In this questionnaire were embedded the two items designed to measure both the
direct and indirect initial attitude (see below). Then, the participants answered the second booklet,
which contained four sections. The first section just contained 14 personality items meant to function as
a distractor.
The second section was devoted to the measurement of ambivalence toward traffic restrictions as a
solution to pollution. In line with the multicomponent perspective on attitudes (Zanna & Rempel, 1988),
ambivalence was measured through a modified version of the open-ended procedure devised by Bell,
Esses, and Maio (1996, see also Esses & Maio, 2002), whereby affective and cognitive components of
ambivalence were assessed. Although the Bell et al. (1996) task consisted of a series of open-ended
questions asking participants to list adjectives (see Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993) and emotions
related to the target issue, a pilot study (N¼ 73) conducted with a sample of students similar to the one
used in the present experiment showed that these students tend to display an excessive rate of
nonresponses. Therefore we preferred to transform the Bell et al. (1996) task into a selection task.
Twenty adjectives (10 positive and 10 negative), derived from the above-mentioned pilot study, were
presented on a page. Participants were asked to select those that they would associate with the topic of
traffic restrictions. On a separate page, 20 emotions (10 positive and 10 negative), also derived from the
pilot study, were presented and participants had to select those that they experienced when they thought
about the topic. After choosing items for a particular component, participants were asked to return to
their list and to assign a valence (favorability rating) to each of their responses. Valences ranged from
3 (extremely negative) to þ3 (extremely positive). For emotions as well as for adjectives, positive
dimension scores were obtained by summing the positive valences across the items listed; negative
dimension scores were computed by summing the negative valences (see below for the exact formula
for computing the ambivalence scores).
In the third section, participants were exposed to the persuasive message, framed as the result of a
survey on the relationship between traffic restriction and pollution reduction, carried out among
communication sciences students (i.e., the participants’ ingroup). The results of this fictitious surveyCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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summarizing the belief that traffic restriction is not at all related to the pollution reduction (e.g., ‘Traffic
is not the main source of environmental damage in urban areas’). On the basis of a pilot study (see
below) we knew that this position would be counter-attitudinal for the studied population. Moreover,
participants for whom the messagewas not counter-attitudinal, based on the pretest direct attitude, were
selected out. Twenty-four participants were thus excluded and our final sample consisted of 131
participants.
Finally, the fourth section was devoted to the post-test measure of the direct and indirect attitude
items, embedded in a series of seven items on the importance of the topic proposed in the persuasive
message. They answered on a 21-point scale in order to prevent the participants from remembering
the exact value of their pretest answer. When they handed in the two booklets, the participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Attitudes and Attitudinal Ambivalence
Attitudes: Pilot study. Direct attitudes consisted of the item ‘Traffic-restrictive policies are useful to
reduce pollution level in cities’, whereas indirect attitude was represented by the item ‘Using Diesel oil
should be forbidden because of its polluting effects’. These two items were chosen on the basis of a
further pilot study, also carried out with communication sciences students (N¼ 40), in which
participants expressed their opinions on the same attitude items on seven-point scales ranging from
‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’. A correlation matrix was computed for all items and the
above two were selected because their correlation was r(40)¼ .40, p< .05. Means showed that
participant were overall in favor of both items (Mdir¼ 6.02, SDdir¼ 1.41 and Mindir¼ 4.26,
SDindir¼ 1.91).Attitudinal ambivalence. To calculate ambivalence, the Bell et al. (1996) formula was applied (see
also Esses & Maio, 2002) to emotions as well as adjectives: PþN 2 jPN j þ 36, where P¼ the
positive dimension score, N¼ the absolute value of the negative dimension score, and 36 is a constant
that is added to preclude negative ambivalence scores. These calculations were performed for both
adjectives and emotions separately and then the ambivalence scores for each one of them were
averaged to compute the overall ambivalence score. Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics for
the three scores. The overall ambivalence score was dichotomized on the basis of the median
(Mdn¼ 32.50) in order to separate the highly ambivalent participants (M¼ 36.82, SD¼ 3.64) from the
less ambivalent participants1 (M¼ 28.09, SD¼ 4.27), F(1, 129)¼ 159.24, p< .001.Results
Initial Attitude
On the pretest direct attitude measure, participants appeared to be in favor of the fact that ‘Today’s
pollution in cities necessitates traffic-restrictive solutions’ (M¼ 5.97, SD¼ 1.08). On the pretest
1Several authors have pointed out that dichotomizing quantitative variables can lead to introducing random error and eventually
biases in the findings (e.g., MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). In this article, we have kept an ANOVA approach, as
commonly practiced in recent attitude research (e.g., Bell & Esses, 2002; Haddock, 2003), because means are more illustrative of
the differences in attitude change on the direct and the indirect level. However, we have checked the reliability of the predicted
interaction with a regression analysis as well, for both experiments (see Footnotes 2 and 3).
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for ambivalence scores and intercorrelations (experiment 1)
M SD Min–max
Correlations
1 2
1. Adjectives 32.05 8.94 6–61
2. Emotions 33.19 5.26 14–48 þ.33
3. Overall ambivalence 32.19 5.73 10.50–50.50 þ.91 þ.70
Note: Correlation is significant at the .001 level.
Attitudinal ambivalence and persuasion 7indirect attitude, participants agreed with the statement ‘Using Diesel oil should be forbidden because
of its polluting effects’ (M¼ 4.50, SD¼ 1.80).
In order to avoid confounding attitudinal ambivalence and initial attitude, the difference in initial
attitude between participants high and low in ambivalence was tested. ANOVAs on both direct and
indirect attitude with ambivalence as a between-subjects factor yielded no significant effects (all
ps>.10).Attitude Change
Pretest and post-test attitude was measured on different scales; thus the 21-point post-test score was
recoded to obtain a seven-point scale such that 1, 2, and 3 correspond to 1; 4, 5, 6 correspond to 2; 7, 8, 9
correspond to 3 and so on. Two attitude change scores were computed, both for direct and indirect
attitude, by subtracting the pretest from the post-test, so that a negative score indicates an influence of
the source’s position. A 2 (level of ambivalence: high vs. low) 2 (level of influence: direct vs.
indirect) mixed ANOVA design with repeated measures on the second factor was performed. The main
effect of attitude level appeared to be significant, F(1,129)¼ 9.82, p< .05, h2¼ .07, indicating that
direct change toward the source (M¼0.49, SD¼ 1.18) was larger than indirect change (M¼.01,
SD¼ 1.35). The main effect of ambivalence level was not significant (p> .10). Importantly, results,
presented in Figure 1, showed the hypothesized interaction effect2, F(1, 129)¼ 4.68, p< .05, h2¼ .035,
confirming that the direct attitude change was oriented toward the source’s position more for highly
ambivalent participants (M¼0.66, SD¼ 1.22) than for participants low in ambivalence (M¼0.30,
SD¼ 1.11), whereas the indirect change was oriented toward the source’s position more for the less
ambivalent participants (M¼0.15, SD¼ 1.37) than for the more ambivalent ones (M¼ 0.11,
SD¼ 1.32).Discussion
The results of the present experiment showed the relevance of our hypothesis. The predicted interaction
between level of ambivalence and level of influence was significant. These results suggest that, in line
with the normative conflict hypothesis (Pe´rez & Mugny, 1996), at the direct level participants low in
ambivalence may have used their attitudinal coherence to resist the counter-attitudinal message2In order to check that the dichotomization has not biased the results of the present analysis, we have tested the predicted
interaction by a regression analysis entering the ambivalence score as a predictor of the difference between the direct change and
the indirect change scores. Results showed that this model accounted for significant variance, R2¼ 0.04, F(1, 129)¼ 4.93,
p< .05, and confirmed that the difference between the two scores depended on the level of the ambivalence score, b¼.19,
t¼ 2.22, p< .05.
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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Figure 1. Experiment 1: Mean attitude change (lower means indicate more influence)
8 Nicoletta Cavazza and Fabrizio Buteraproposed by the ingroup majority more than participants high in ambivalence, while at the indirect
level, where the link with the source’s message is less apparent, participants low in ambivalence shifted
toward the source’s position more than participants high in ambivalence.
The above analysis implies that the observed effects rely upon the participants’ concern for the
normative demands of being confronted to the ingroup majority. If this motivational explanation holds
true, the obtained pattern of result should be particularly apparent for those individuals who are the
most concerned about the demands of the social situation, those who have a strategic approach to
self-presentation. An effective way to test this hypothesis would be to inspect the moderating role of
self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974). Indeed self-monitoring refers to ‘individual differences in the extent to
which individuals can and do monitor their self-presentation, expressive behavior, and nonverbal
affective displays’ (Snyder, 1974, pp. 526–527). In other words, high self-monitors are the people who
are the most concerned with the demands of social situations: DeBono (1987) found that high (vs. low)
self-monitors are more persuaded by a normative (vs. value based) message and he interpreted this
result as an evidence of the social adaptive function of attitude for this kind of individuals. Thus, in
experiment 2 we will test the hypothesis that the dynamics observed in experiment 1 will be more
pronounced for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors.EXPERIMENT 2Method
Participants
One-hundred and fifty-one students at Modena-Reggio Emilia University volunteered for this
experiment. Forty-four were men and 104 women (3 did not answer the question) with a mean age of
21.09 (SD¼ 3.22). On the basis of the pretest direct attitude (see below), the participants for whom the
message was not counter-attitudinal were selected out. Forty-four participants were thus excluded andCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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yield any significant main or interaction effects and therefore will not be presented.Materials and Procedure
The procedure of the present experiment was identical to the one followed in experiment 1. However,
one main difference, as compared to experiment 1, was introduced: The personality scale in the first
section was no longer a filler questionnaire but contained the 25 items of the self-monitoring scale
(Italian validation by Forzi, Arcuri, & Kodilja, 1987).Attitudes
Again we used ‘Traffic-restrictive policies are useful to reduce pollution level in cities’ and ‘Using
Diesel oil should be forbidden because of its polluting effects’ as direct and indirect items.Attitudinal Ambivalence
Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics for the three ambivalence scores, computed as in the
previous experiment. The overall ambivalence scorewas again dichotomized on the basis of the median
(Mdn¼ 22.00) in order to separate the highly ambivalent participants (M¼ 26.40, SD¼ 3.78) from the
less ambivalent participants (M¼ 17.28, SD¼ 4.11), F(1, 104)¼ 140.81, p< .001.Self-Monitoring Scale
We measured self-monitoring orientation through the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974), in the
Italian version translated and validated by Forzi et al. (1987). It consisted of 25 balanced items with a
five-point response scale ranging from 1 ‘it absolutely does not describe my behavior’ to 5 ‘it
completely describes my behavior’. We calculated an overall index of self-monitoring (a¼ .72) as the
mean of the 25 items of the scale. Then we splitted the sample on the mid-point of the scale (3), which
resulted in 69 low self-monitoring participants (M¼ 2.59, SD¼ 0.27), those the least concerned with
the demands of social situations, and 37 high self-monitoring participants (M¼ 3.29, SD¼ 0.30,
F(1,104)¼ 146.98, p< .001), the most concerned.Table 2. Descriptive statistics for ambivalence scores and intercorrelations (experiment 2)
M SD Min–max
Correlations
1 2
1. Adjectives 20.87 8.78 0–49
2. Emotions 22.81 5.89 2–37 þ.33
3. Overall ambivalence 21.84 6.04 6–42.50 þ.88 þ.73
Note: Correlation is significant at the .001 level.
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
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Initial Attitude
On the pretest direct attitude measure, participants clearly agreed with the statement ‘Traffic-restrictive
policies are useful to reduce pollution level in cities’ (M¼ 5.45, SD¼ 1.15) and were slightly in favor
of the fact that ‘Using Diesel oil should be forbidden because of its polluting effects’ (M¼ 4.25,
SD¼ 1.84). In order to avoid confounding attitudinal ambivalence, self-monitoring orientation and
initial attitude, two analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on both direct and indirect attitude, with
ambivalence and self-monitoring orientation as between-participants factors were conducted. Neither
of them yielded significant effects (all ps>.10).
It should also be noted that self-monitoring and ambivalence are not correlated r(106)¼.006, n.s.
This might be due to the fact that self-monitoring is conceptualized as a personality trait, whereas
ambivalence is object-specific; for instance, the same high self-monitoring person may hold univalent
attitudes on some objects and ambivalent attitudes on others.
Attitude Change
Again post-test attitude measures have been transformed in a 7-point scale by recoding the 21-point
scale. Two attitude change scores were computed, both for direct and indirect attitude, by subtracting
the pretest from the post-test, so that a negative score indicates an influence of the source’s position. A 2
(level of ambivalence: high vs. low) 2 (self-monitoring orientation: high vs. low) 2 (level of
influence: direct vs. indirect) mixed ANOVAwith repeated measures on the third factor was performed.
Results yielded a main effect of attitude level, F(1,102)¼ 10.03, p< .05, h2¼ .09, and two significant
interactions: A two-way interaction between ambivalence and level of attitude change,
F(1,102)¼ 7.30, p< .05, h2¼ .07, as in experiment 1, and the hypothesized three-way interaction
between the three factors3, F(1, 102)¼ 6.69, p< .05, h2¼ .06.
Table 3 shows means and standard deviations for all conditions. The three-way interaction pointed out
that the interaction effect between level of ambivalence and level of attitude change was, as expected,
significant for high self-monitoring respondents, F(1,35)¼ 17.26, p< .001, whereas it was not for low
self-monitors, F(1, 67)< 1. Results for high self-monitors revealed that direct attitude change toward the
source’s position was more pronounced for high-ambivalence participants (M¼2.10, SD¼ 1.48) than
for low-ambivalence participants (M¼0.29, SD¼ 1.26), whereas the reverse pattern emerged for
indirect change: (Mhigh ambivalence¼0.15, SD¼ 0.99, Mlow ambivalence¼0.65, SD¼ 1.45), thereby
replicating the results found in experiment 1. These dynamics are depicted in Figure 2.DISCUSSIONThe second experiment replicated the significant interaction effect between level of ambivalence and
level of influence already found in experiment 1. In line with the specific hypotheses of the present
experiment, the results confirmed the moderating role of self-monitoring orientation in the above3A hierarchical regression analysis entering the ambivalence and the self-monitoring scores in the first step and the interaction
term in the second step as predictors of the difference between the direct change and the indirect change scores showed that the
first model accounted for significant variance, R2¼ 0.07, F(2, 103)¼ 3.71, p< .05 and confirmed that the difference between the
two scores depended on the level of the ambivalence score, b¼.24, t¼ 2.50, p< .05. The second model increased significantly
the portion of explained variance, R2change¼ 0.031, F(3, 102)¼ 3.58, p< .02; the effect of ambivalence level disappeared in favor
of the interaction between the two predictors, b¼1.28, t¼ 1.77, p¼ .08.
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Table 3. Mean attitude change (and standard deviation) as a function of self-monitoring orientation, level of
ambivalence, and level of attitude change (experiment 2)
Self-monitoring orientation
Ambivalence Level of attitude change High Low
High Direct 2.10 (1.48) 0.82 (1.99)
Indirect 0.15 (0.98) 0.21 (1.63)
Low Direct 0.29 (1.26) 0.55 (1.54)
Indirect 0.64 (1.45) 0.00 (1.39)
Note: Negative scores indicate a change in the direction advocated by the message.
Attitudinal ambivalence and persuasion 11effects: It was shown that, when high in self-monitoring, participants high in ambivalence obtained
change scores that approached the source’s position more than participants low in ambivalence at the
direct level, while at the indirect level the difference between participants high and low in ambivalence
followed the reverse pattern. These dynamics did not appear for participants low in self-monitoring.
This three-way interaction supports our motivational interpretation that the opposite pattern of results
for high and low ambivalence participants under normative conflict is really due to a strategic
adaptation to the normative demands of the relationship with the ingroup majority, as these dynamics
appear particularly for those participants who are the most sensitive to the social context (the high
self-monitors). The low self-monitors have a lower need to manage their self-presentation in
accordance with the ingroup stance, which may explain why their ambivalence level does not
determine their reaction to the persuasive message.GENERAL DISCUSSIONThe two studies presented in this article showed convergent evidence to support the hypothesis that, in
front of a counter-attitudinal message proposed by an ingroup majority, highly ambivalent people shiftHigh self-monitors
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Figure 2. Experiment 2: Mean attitude change (lower means indicate more influence) for high self-monitors
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12 Nicoletta Cavazza and Fabrizio Buteratheir position toward the influence source to a greater extent than less ambivalent people at the direct
level, but that at the indirect level highly ambivalent people resist influence more than less ambivalent
people. Both studies presented here suggest that ambivalent attitudes can be functional in a context of
persuasive normative communication. The coexistence of pro and con components within the same
attitude structure allowed highly ambivalent participants to solve the normative conflict at the direct
level, by expressing one of the components, that in the direction of the ingroup majority, more so than
participants low in ambivalence. At the indirect level, in turn, the impact of the influence source on
participants high in ambivalence was thus reduced, as compared to participants low in ambivalence.
Thus, paradoxically, manifest conformity allowed highly ambivalent participants to reduce latent
change, comparatively to low-ambivalence participants.
These results constitute a contribution to Maio and Olson’s (2000) question regarding the functions
fulfilled by ambivalent attitudes. In fact, there are situations in which ambivalent attitudes are
functional. Some of these functions have already been shown and tested in the literature (Fong, 2003;
Hanze, 2001; Lipkus et al., 2001; Mucchi Faina et al., 2002). The present motivational explanation
suggests that attitudinal ambivalence may be used to strategically avoid deep change. This idea is
comforted by Maio and Haddock’s (2004), statement: ‘It is possible that social norms make it
occasionally desirable to have high ambivalence in an attitude. Ambivalence may be desirable when an
issue is controversial. In this situation, people who appear ambivalent may give the impression of being
fair and knowledgeable. These individuals may also be inoffensive to others because they ‘‘agree’’ with
everyone to some extent’ (2004, p. 435).
The strategic function of ambivalent attitudes was further stressed by the moderating role of
self-monitoring found in experiment 2. Indeed, it showed that a dispositional factor related to the
sensitivity to social adjustment affected the way participants were influenced by the ingroup majority’s
message as a function of their ambivalence level. These findings are in accordance with Bell and Esses
(2002), who described how individuals with ambivalent attitudes can modify the expression of their
attitude in order to satisfy an internal motivation.
Three limitations should be noted. First, although attitude change varied in the predicted directions,
the amplitude of attitude change itself is not very high in both studies. This could be due to the
experimental context, which implied a paper–pencil task, in anonymous conditions, and in a collective
testing situation. Further research in a more naturalistic setting, in which participants would be more
involved in the expression of attitudes and more affected by normative conflict, might find greater
attitude change effects. Second, the present studies have inspected the hypothesized effect by
operationalizing the two levels of influence with the direct and indirect measures. Stronger evidence,
however, could come from replicating these findings by operationalizing the two levels of influence in
other ways, for instance by measuring attitudes at a private and a public level or at immediate and
delayed phases (Moscovici, 1980). Finally, in our experiments the counter-attitudinal message was
always negatively framed and therefore the results may not be generalizable to positively framed
messages. We suspect, however, that a positive frame might weaken the observed effects because
ambivalence involves a negativity bias, consisting of a stronger impact of negative information on
overall evaluation (Broemer, 2002; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997).
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that the present research contributes to the attitudes
literature in three ways. First, research that has addressed the relationship between attitudinal
ambivalence and attitude change has generally studied it only at the direct level (e.g., Broemer, 2002;
Hodson et al., 2001). The present research shows that articulating the direct and the indirect levels may
show a hidden pattern of influence that might otherwise be overlooked. Second, literature on social
influence and attitude change did address the question of the different levels of influence (Alvaro &
Crano, 1997; Pe´rez &Mugny, 1987), but mainly studied it by focusing on source, message, and context
variables. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that articulates a structural characteristic ofCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1–15 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
Attitudinal ambivalence and persuasion 13attitudes, such as ambivalence, with levels of influence. Third, our results suggest that ambivalence
might contribute to make attitudinal structure more flexible than does the absence of ambivalence.
Indeed, the normative counter-attitudinal message did not result in a global structural change, but a
superficial adaptation to the context, suggesting that people high in ambivalence would be able to
activate the various components of their attitudes in a strategic way. Having a wider repertoire of
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